Introduction
Few decision makers can rely on objective probabilities when they make decisions over an uncertain future. A decision maker's confidence in a probabilistic description of the future generally varies between scenarios and over different aspects of a scenario under evaluation. For example, the probability of an earthquake in a given region might be better assessed than that of a terroristic attack (or the probability of a nuclear meltdown resulting from either of these). Returns to investment in an Arab or Asian country might be governed by a confidently known distribution given a particular political situation. However, the stability of the system is often a less confidently known guess. Forecasting droughts for a highly perturbed climate results in a less reliable probability distribution than a similar forecast in a scenario with a stringent mitigation policy. This paper derives an evaluation framework that permits the decision maker to take into consideration the confidence in probability distributions employed to describe the future. The underlying axiomatic framework stays as close to an intertemporal version of the wide-spread von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) setting as possible, making the framework accessible to a general audience.
The present representation gives rise to a decision support framework for economic agents and policy makers who want to employ probabilities for forecasting the future and, at the same time, take into account differences in the confidence in or character of the uncertainties they are facing. The underlying axioms are selected to satisfy common rationality constraints and to be normatively attractive. In consequence, the present framework distinguishes itself from the recent ambiguity literature by taking probabilities and classifications of probabilities as given inputs for the decision process. The resulting representation shows how this information translates into a comprehensive evaluation of scenarios.
1 In some environments, the decision maker characterizes his probabilistic beliefs and his confidence in these beliefs himself. In other environments, the decision maker relies on distributions derived by scientists. He then either adds his own evaluation of confidence, or asks the scientists to supply this additional dimension of uncertainty. For example, the recent report by the International Panel on Climate Change follows the latter procedure by asking the lead authors of the different assessments to provide not just probabilistic estimates of the Subjective Risk, Confidence, and Ambiguity uncertainties, but to classify them at the same time as one of three different categories of increasing confidence or reliability (IPCC 2001, Box TS.1, p 22) . Currently these distinctions end in the science part of the report and are not integrated into the economic evaluation. The present framework can be applied to cost benefit analysis or integrated assessment under uncertainty in order to close this gap. The motivation for the present paper is to construct a decision support framework that satisfies normative criteria for decision making under uncertainty. However, the resulting representation generalizes Klibanoff, Marinacci & Mukerji's (2009) model of smooth ambiguity aversion, which is motivated from a behavioral viewpoint. Therefore, the paper also speaks to the behavioral literature on decision making under ambiguity. I briefly discuss behaviorally plausible attitudes with respect to confidence or subjectivity of beliefs that are ruled out by the rationality constraints underlying the current framework. The current paper makes no distinction between indexing lotteries by confidence or subjectivity. While the word "confidence" might better suit the normative foundation of the paper, the close relation to Klibanoff et al.'s (2009) distinction between objective and subjective lotteries makes me use the subjectivity terminology for large parts of the discussion. The subjectivity terminology here derives from the concept of probabilities representing beliefs, which only in special cases are informed by the objectivist's definition of a probability distribution based on frequency or symmetry reasoning.
The idea of enriching probabilistic beliefs by a degree of confidence goes back to Ellsberg's (1961) suggestion for resolving the paradox today carrying his name. It basically states that (a good fraction of) people prefer to bet on known as opposed to unknown probabilities. Over the last two decades, several strands of literature on decision making under uncertainty evolved around this paradox. One of these approaches abandons the concept of probabilities and replaces it with a non-additive set function called a capacity. In the resulting representations "expected values" are formed using the so called Choquet-integral, which resulted in the name Choquet expected utility (e.g. Schmeidler 1989 , Chateauneuf, Grant & Eichberger 2007 . Another approach assigns sets of probabilities to different scenarios and constructs decision criteria on these sets, e.g. maximizing the minimal expected utility, (e.g. Gilboa & Schmeidler 1989 , Ghirardato, Maccheroni & Marinacci 2004 , Maccheroni, Marinacci & Rustichini 2006 . The latter approach is often referred to as a "multiprior" approach. Various equivalence results between Choquet expected utility and Subjective Risk, Confidence, and Ambiguity the multiprior approach have been shown. My paper relates most closely to a class of models that works with second order probabilities to capture non-risk uncertainty, including Segal (1990) , Klibanoff, Marinacci & Mukerji (2005) , Seo (2009) , Ergin & Gul (2009) , and Klibanoff et al. (2009) . For certain consumption paths my representation coincides with the intertemporally additive standard model. A utility function u t evaluates outcomes in every period (and state of the world) and measures intertemporal substitutability. The aggregation over (various layers of) uncertainty is carried out by a generalized mean f −1 t [Ef t (·)] (Hardy, Littlewood & Polya 1964) . The concavity of the function f captures uncertainty attitude in the sense of intertemporal risk aversion (Traeger 2007) . This aversion function f t depends on the degree of subjectivity of the lottery.
The representation closest to the current paper is Klibanoff et al. (2009) . The authors distinguish between objective versus subjective lotteries, which corresponds to a binary measure of confidence or subjectivity within my framework. In Klibanoff et al.'s (2009) model a subjective lottery is by definition a second stage lottery over first stage objective lotteries. In contrast, this paper makes the degree of subjectivity an explicit component of the uncertainty characterization and detaches it from a hierarchical structure of probabilities. Klibanoff et al. (2009) implicitly impose that objective lotteries are evaluated intertemporally risk neutral, which means that risk aversion to objective risk is only driven by aversion to intertemporal consumption fluctuations. There is no intrinsic aversion to risk. Formally, this assumption translates into the use of expected values rather than a generalized mean to aggregate over objective risk. In contrast, risk aversion to subjective lotteries incorporates intrinsic risk aversion and uses the generalized mean for evaluation. The authors identify the curvature of the corresponding weight-function with smooth ambiguity attitude. The generalized framework of this paper incorporates both, intrinsic risk aversion to objective as well as to subjective risk. Relating the two gives a better understanding and a more precise definition of the measure of smooth ambiguity aversion. Moreover, the current setting facilitates a three-fold disentanglement of dimensions of preference. One way to span these dimensions is in terms of intertemporal substitutability, aversion to objective risk, and ambiguity aversion. Alternative coordinates for these dimensions are offered. Finally, the present framework extends the concept of smooth ambiguity aversion to situations with an arbitrary number of subjectivity or confidence labels. Here, a generalized form of ambiguity aversion translates into Subjective Risk, Confidence, and Ambiguity an aversion to the degree of subjectivity of (or the lack of confidence in) probabilistic beliefs. In research paralleling the present paper, Hayashi & Miao (2011) extend Klibanoff et al.'s (2009) setting in a similar direction. The authors adopt a more technical setting using an Anscombe & Aumann (1963) version of Klibanoff et al. (2009) and an extension of Seo (2009) . Similar to the present paper, the authors develop a framework that, at least in principle, permits to distinguish between intertemporal substitution, risk aversion, and ambiguity aversion. However, the function whose curvature the authors identify with risk aversion is only unique up to increasing transformations. The only function that is not subject to this indeterminacy is their extended definition of smooth ambiguity aversion. This measure coincides with my suggested measure of smooth ambiguity aversion, which I generalize to the notion of aversion to the subjectivity of belief. Hayashi & Miao (2011) stick to the more limiting hierarchical structure of subjective over objective lotteries discussed already for the setting of Klibanoff et al. (2009) . Both, Klibanoff et al. (2009) and Hayashi & Miao (2011) , go a step further than the present paper in discussing learning and relating the paper to the standard Bayesian framework.
Section 2 introduces the setting of the paper. Section 3 summarizes the axioms underlying the representation. Section 4 states the representation and demonstrates how to evaluate a simple example. Section 5 discusses the notions of smooth ambiguity aversion and aversion to the lack of confidence in beliefs as well as the disentanglement of the various dimensions of preference. Section 6 analyzes behavioral implications and sketches normative applications. Section 7 concludes. Proofs are gathered in the appendix.
The Setting
I first provide a graphical illustration of the uncertainty structure underlying the model and and explain the basic concepts necessary to understand the axioms and the representation. Then I formalize the general setting.
Graphical illustration
In every period uncertainty is described by an uncertainty tree that compasses an arbitrary number of individual lotteries. The left hand side of Figure 1 Figure 1: Example of two decision trees, p t ∈ Z 3 (X * × P t+1 ) and p r t ∈ Z 2 (X * × P t+1 ), depicting uncertainty resolving in period t. Each uncertainty node is labeled with the degree of subjectivity of the corresponding lottery. The leaves of the trees are omitted and would consist of differing elements (x t , p t+1 ) ∈ X * × P t+1 . Lottery p r t is obtained from lottery p t by collapsing the root lottery with the subsequent layer of uncertainty sharing the same degree of subjectivity. A decision maker satisfying axiom A1 is indifferent between the two depicted decision trees.
an uncertainty tree with three layers of uncertainty. Each node of the tree represents a (sub -) lottery. Each of these (sub -) lotteries is indexed with a label s ∈ S representing the confidence in (or the subjectivity of) the corresponding lottery. Elements of S can specify verbal descriptions of relevant characteristics surrounding the derivation of the probabilities like "careful econometric analysis", "high frequency observation", "expert opinion", "causality poorly understood", "wild guess", "principle of insufficient reason", or "maximum entropy". Alternatively, the decision maker can employ labels such as "confident", "less confident", "not at all confident" or he can employ the labels "unpredictability", "structural uncertainty", and "value uncertainty" suggested by the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2001, Box TS.1, p 22) . The main representation theorem in section 4 does not assume that the set S is ordered. Only later in section 5 do I assume the existence of an order relation on S (such as "more confident than"). The branches of the uncertainty trees do not have to coincide in length. For example, a flip of a coin can decide whether an agent consumes a certain amount, or enters another lottery. Figure 1 omits the leaves of the uncertainty tree. The leaves specify the consumption payoff x t of the decision maker in period t as well as the uncertainty he faces at the beginning of the next period p t+1 .
I define a functionŝ(·) that returns the subjectivity label of the root for every lottery p t . In Figure 1 it isŝ(p t ) =ŝ(p r t ) = s. I refer to the degree of subjectivityŝ(p t ) of the root lottery as the degree of subjectivity of lottery p t . Similarly, a functionn(·) returns the uncertainty layer of the root of a lottery p t or the depth of the representing uncertainty tree in period t. The lotteries in Figure 1 yieldn(p t ) = 3 andn(p r t ) = 2. I refer to the numbern(p t ) of a lottery p t as its rank. Lottery p r t in Figure 1 is a rank 2 lottery over two lotteries of rank 1 and two certain outcomes of rank 0 (which take the form (x t , p t+1 )). In general, a lottery of rank n can be a lottery over a continuum of lotteries with rank smaller than n.
The first two uncertainty layers of lottery p t on the left hand side of Figure 1 share the same degree of subjectivity. Given both uncertainty layers are of the same type, I define a reduction of these two uncertainty layers into a single layer by multiplying the corresponding probabilities. The resulting lottery p r t is depicted on the right hand side of Figure 1 , where the superindex r denotes the reduction. Finally, Figure 2 shows a mixing of two lotteries p t and p ′ t .
The mixing operator ⊕ 1 3 s mixes two lotteries with degree of subjectivity s assigning probability 1 3 to the first lottery and probability 1 − 1 3 to the second lottery. Because the operator mixes both lotteries within the same uncertainty layer, both lotteries have to coincide in the degree of subjectivity (of their root lottery). In a remark at the end of the next section, I also introduce an alternative operator ⊙ α s that mixes two lotteries of arbitrary, and possibly differing, degree of subjectivity on the next higher uncertainty level. Here, α labels again the probability weight of the first lottery, while s labels the degree of subjectivity of the mixed lottery (whose rank is one more than that of the higher ranked lottery entering the mixture).
The technical setting
Time is discrete with a planning horizon T ∈ IN. In the usual abuse of notation T denotes at the same time the set {0, . . . , T } . Elements x of a connected compact metric space X * describe outcomes in any period t ∈ T . These elements represent consumption levels or a collection of general welfare relevant characteristics. To avoid repetition, I introduce several definitions using a generic compact metric space X instead of X * . The Borel σ-algebra on X is denoted B(X). Let S be a finite index set.
The decision maker employs the index s ∈ S to distinguish between lotteries (denoting general uncertain situations) that differ in terms of subjectivity of or confidence in the probabilistic belief. For every s ∈ S, I denote by ∆ s (X) a space of Borel probability measures on X that describe a lottery with degree of subjectivity s. Formally, these different lottery spaces are a family ∆(X), s s∈S . Each space ∆ s (X) is equipped with the Prohorov metric giving rise to the topology of weak convergence. I introduce an additional element s 0 ∈ S and defineS = S ∪s 0 . The element s 0 serves the purpose of defining under abuse of notation ∆ s 0 (X) = X, making the space X part of the family {∆ s 0 (X)} s∈S . I introduce higher order lotteries inductively over the parameter n ∈ N = {0, 1, . . . , N }, which defines the maximal depth of the uncertainty tree within a period. 2 I start by setting Z 0 (X) = Y 0 s 0 (X) = X. In the first induction step, I define for n > 0 the lottery spaces Y n s (X) = ∆ s (Z n−1 (X)) for all s ∈S.
These spaces describe the set of uncertainty trees of maximal depth n with a root lottery of subjectivity s. In the second induction step, I define the general choice space Z n (X) = ∪ s∈S Y n s (X), which collects uncertainty trees with different degrees of subjectivity in the root. The inclusion of s 0 in the (disjoint) union allows the uncertainty tree to have branches of differing length. The spaces Z n (X) are equipped with the (disjoint) union topology and, thus, compact. In a static setting the decision maker's choice objects would be described as elements of Z N (X * ). These elements represent arbitrary concatenations of lotteries with differing degrees of subjectivity with a maximal uncertainty tree depth of N . Figure 1 depicts two examples of an uncertainty structure contained in Z 3 (·).
Subjective Risk, Confidence, and Ambiguity I construct the general choice space in the intertemporal setting recursively. In the last period, choices are p T ∈ P T = Z N (X * ). Preceding choice spaces are defined by P t−1 = Z N (X * × P t ) for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T }, where X * × P t is equipped with the product topology. Thus, at the beginning of every period uncertainty is described as a composition of lotteries with differing degrees of subjectivity over current outcomes and over the uncertainty that describes the decision maker's future. I call the choice object p t ∈ P t in period t a generalized temporal lottery. They generalize Kreps & Porteus's (1978) concept of a temporal lottery. I define the rank n of a lottery p t ∈ P t by the functionn :
The rank captures the level of concatenation of a lottery, which corresponds to the depth of the representing uncertainty tree (within period t). I define the function s :
It maps a generalized temporal lottery into the degree of subjectivity of its root lottery and assigns s 0 if there is no uncertainty resolved in period t. The space P s t = {p t ∈ P t |ŝ(p t ) ∈ {s, s 0 }} denotes the space of all period t lotteries in which the root lottery has a degree of subjectivity s (as in Figure 1 ) and includes the certain outcomes. I denote the sigma algebra of events evaluated by lotteries p t ∈ P t of rankn(p t ) = n by B n t = B (Z n−1 (X * × P t+1 )) , 0 < n ≤ N . For a set B and 0 < n ≤ N I denote the set's restriction to events measurable by lotteries of rank n by B
e. no uncertainty resolves in period t, I introduce the notation
I use these restrictions B n t of the event set for composing lotteries of differing rank. The following composition of two lotteries lies at the core of the independence axiom. It composes two lotteries sharing the same degree of subjectivity. For any s ∈ S, p t , p 
for all B ∈ B n * t . Note that the lottery resulting from this mixture lives in the same space as the higher ranked lottery of p t and p ′ t . An example of such a mixture is depicted in Figure 2 .
Whenever the root lottery p t ∈ P t shares the same degree of subjectivity with the subsequent layer of uncertainty (as in the left tree in Figure 1 ), I define a reduced lottery that collapses these layers sharing the same degree of subjectivity into a single layer. For any lottery
for all B ∈ B n t . An example is given in Figure 1 . The lottery p r t collapses the root lottery and the subsequent layer of uncertainty in lottery p t , both sharing the same degree of subjectivity, into a single layer of uncertainty.
The Cartesian product X = X * T +1 ⊂ P 0 characterizes the set of all certain consumption paths faced in the present. A consumption paths x ∈ X is written
as the consumption path that coincides with x in all but the i th period, in which it yields outcome x. I denote the set of certain consumption paths faced in period t by
In every period t ∈ T the decision maker's preferences t are a binary relation on P t .
Further Remarks: The operator ⊕ α s mixes same degree of subjectivity lotteries within a given uncertainty layer (which is given by the lottery with the higher rank). An alternative composition mixes two arbitrary lotteries on an elevated level. For defining this alternative composition, I denote lotteries in P pt are different for s = s ′ (the axioms will imply that all three are evaluated the same). For any
, and with n * = max{n(p t ),n(p ′ t )} + 1 ≤ N , I define an elevating probability α mixture by the operation ⊙ α s :
for all B ∈ B n * t . If both lotteries p t and p ′ t share the same degree of subjectivity, it stands to reason that a decision maker is indifferent whether probabilities are manipulated at the same lottery level or whether the manipulation takes place at an elevated level. Such an assumption corresponds to the statement
Indifference in equation (3) is a special case of an axiom requiring indifference to the reduction of same degree of subjectivity lotteries introduced in the next section.
Axioms
The first axiom makes the decision maker indifferent to the reduction of same degree of subjectivity lotteries. Using the notation of a reduced lottery introduced in equation (1) the assumption is A1 (indifference to reduction of lotteries with same degree of subjectivity)
A decision maker who satisfies axiom A1 is indifferent between the two lotteries depicted in Figure 1 . Note that the literature mentioned in the introduction that employs second order probabilities employs the uncertainty layer in order to distinguish between objective and subjective lotteries. In these papers, uncertainty attitude is tied to the layer and layers cannot be reduced. Instead, I tie the difference in uncertainty attitude directly to subjectivity and confidence as opposed to the level or order in which uncertainty strikes the agent. This way I can impose axiom A1 (and satisfy equation 3) without losing the desired additional dimension of uncertainty.
Subjective Risk, Confidence, and Ambiguity
The following three axioms largely replicate the standard von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) axioms for the compact metric space setting (e.g. Grandmont 1972 ).
A2 (weak order) For all t ∈ T preferences t are transitive and complete, i.e.:
− transitive: For all p t , p
The independence axiom is the only axiom that is slightly modified. I could call it "independence with respect to same degree of subjectivity mixing". It is mostly a technical assumption to require the same degree of subjectivity for the lotteries
t and the ⊕ α s operator. This assumption is necessary to permit a meaningful mixing at a given uncertainty layer. The fact that mixing takes place only for lotteries with coinciding degrees of subjectivity and within the uncertainty layer of the higher ranked lottery is further discussed in the remark at the end of this section. The remark also discuss an alternative independence axiom that mixes lotteries of differing degrees of subjectivity at a higher uncertainty level.
I add additive separability on certain consumption paths in order to replicate the predominant framework for certain intertemporal choice. I employ the axiomatization of Wakker (1988) .
Subjective Risk, Confidence, and Ambiguity
Wakker (1988) calls part i) of the axiom coordinate independence. It requires that the choice between two consumption paths does not depend on period t consumption, whenever the latter coincides for both paths. Part ii) is known as the Thomsen condition. It is required only if the model is limited to two periods. 4 Preferences in different periods are related by the following consistency assumption adapted from Kreps & Porteus (1978) .
A6 (time consistency) For all t ∈ {0, ..., T − 1}:
The axiom is a requirement for choosing between two consumption plans in period t, both of which are degenerate and yield a coinciding outcome in the respective period. For these choice situations, axiom A6 demands that in period t, the decision maker prefers the plan that gives rise to the lottery that is preferred in period t + 1.
Further Remarks: I pointed out that the operator ⊕ α s and, thus, the independence axiom A3, mixes same degree of subjectivity lotteries within the root level of the higher ranked lottery. In the remark of the preceding section, I defined an alternative mixture composition ⊙ α s where the mixture of two lotteries happens at an elevated level, incrementing the rank. An alternative to axiom A3 is the following axiom A3' (elevating independence) For all s ∈ S, α ∈ [0, 1], t ∈ T , and p t , p
The axiom differs from axiom A3 in two respects. First, it no longer requires that the lotteries p t , p ′ t , and p ′′ t share a common degree of subjectivity. Second, it creates the lottery mixture on a higher level than either of the individual lotteries, which is necessary to accommodate the differing degrees of subjectivity. The first change makes it stronger, however, the second change disconnects the levels of the primitive lotteries and the mixed lottery.
The final paragraph discusses the relation between axioms A3' and A3. It is easily verified that indifference between the ⊕ α s and the ⊙ α s operations holds in the sense of equation (3) under the assumption of indifference to the reduction of same Subjective Risk, Confidence, and Ambiguity degree of subjectivity lotteries axiom A1.
5 Therefore, under assumption A1, axiom A3' implies axiom A3, 6 and axiom A3 implies axiom A3' restricted to same degree of subjectivity lotteries. It might be less obvious that already axiom A2 ensures that axiom A3 implies axiom A3' for same degree of subjectivity lotteries. The reason is that axiom A3 itself already contains a mild version of an assumption of indifference to the reduction of degenerate lotteries. See appendix A for details.
The Representation
This section gives a welfare representation for preferences satisfying the axioms introduced in the preceding section. A detailed discussion of the representation is delegated to section 5. I close the current section by illustrating how to apply the theorem to an evaluation of the uncertainty tree depicted in Figure 1 .
The represenation theorem
The representation recursively constructs a welfare functionû t : X * × P t+1 → IR that evaluates degenerate outcomes in every period. Within a period, the representation recursively evaluates the different layers of uncertainty (subtrees of the uncertainty tree in Figure 1 ). The risk aversion in evaluating a lottery at a particular node is tied to the degree of subjectivity. This risk aversion can be captured by a set of continuous functionsf t = {f s t } s∈S , f s t : IR → IR. I call these functions uncertainty aggregation weights. I define the generalized uncertainty aggregator Mf t ut : P t → IR for a given continuous bounded functionû t : X * × P t+1 → IR and a given set of uncertainty aggregation weightsf t = {f s t } s∈S as follows. For degenerate lotteries
Then inductively increase the domain to lotteries of rankn(p t ) = 1, 2, ..., N by defining
where the sign • emphasizes functional composition as opposed to multiplication and the superindex −1 inverts the function in brackets. For any step in the recursion the expression Mf t ut p ′ t captures certainty equivalent welfare for the lottery p ′ t . The certainty equivalent welfare of each of these p ′ t subtrees is transformed with the uncertainty aggregation weight fŝ (pt) t , corresponding to the degree of subjectivity of the lottery p t . The integral sums over these probability weighted values and, finally, the inverse function fŝ (pt) t −1 renormalizes the expression. The basic structure of the right hand side of equation (4) is that of a generalized mean of the form
where the variable z is the certainty equivalent welfare at a given layer of the uncertainty tree. A generalized mean of the form f −1 [Ef (z)] results in a lower welfare equivalent than Ez if the function f is increasing and concave. Therefore the concavity of f captures a form of risk aversion that will be discussed in detail in section 5. In equation (4) the function f , and thus risk aversion, generally depends on the subjectivityŝ(p t ) of the lottery over which expectations are taken.
Theorem 1: The sequence of preference relations ( t ) t∈T satisfies axioms A1-A6 if, and only if, for all t ∈ T there exist a set of strictly increasing and continuous functionsf t = {f s t } s∈S , f s t : IR → IR, and a continuous and bounded function u t : X * → U ⊂ IR such that by defining recursively the functionsû T = u T and
holds for all t ∈ T and all p t , p
Preferences ( t ) t∈T over the space of generalized temporal lotteries can be represented by the sequence (u t ,f t ) t∈T . The functions u t represent per period utility and inform the recursive construction of the intertemporal welfare functionû t (equation 5). For the evaluation of a certain scenario, the per period utility functions provide sufficient information as Mf
. The functionsf t inform the generalized uncertainty evaluation. Every layer of uncertainty resolving in period t is evaluated according to its degree of subjectivity according to equation (4).
Note that the representation in Theorem 1 is linear in every time step. In a setting where lotteries are not distinguished by their degree of subjectivity, the representation of this paper closely corresponds to Kreps & Porteus (1978) . In their representation, Kreps & Porteus (1978) use a linear uncertainty aggregation at the expense of a nonlinear time aggregation. Traeger (2007) shows how to shift this non-linearity between the time and the risk dimension. In the current setting, however, lotteries vary in their degree of subjectivity. Here, giving up linearity in the time step in equation (5) Further Remarks: The representation building on axioms A1 to A6 satisfies as well elevating independence, axiom A3', which mixes lotteries of differing degrees of subjectivity (the proof is appended to the proof of Theorem 1). Axiom A3' can be considered a normatively desirable property. Axiom A1 is responsible for connecting the uncertainty weights on the different layers. It implies the existence of a setf t that is independent of the uncertainty layer.
Example
Assume that the decision maker faces a two period problem with a certain payoff in period 0 and an uncertain payoff in period 1 that is described by the lottery depicted on the left hand side of Figure 1 . The payoffs at the leaves, omitted in the graph, are from top to bottom x, x, x * , x * , x, x. The payoff in the first period is x * . Assume that the corresponding utility values are u(x) = 6, u(x) = 0, and u(x * ) = 5 and that second period utility is discounted by the factor β = 40 41
implying a rate of pure time preference of approximately 2.5%. In a unidimensional setting these utilities can be generated by setting x = 20, x = 0, x * = 12, and employing the utility functions u 0 (x 0 ) = ln(1+x 2 0 ) and u 1 (x 1 ) = β ln(1+x 
.
The uncertainty tree comprises two more layers of uncertainty. By axiom A1 the decision maker could alternatively evaluate a single reduced layer of uncertainty, which is depicted in the tree on the right hand side of Figure 1 . The following calculation illustrates this equivalence by tackling the two remaining uncertainty layers simultaneously, where curly brackets relate to the uncertainty aggregation in the root and square brackets correspond to uncertainty aggregation in the subsequent layer: consumption. In the original evaluation the decision maker is indifferent to the lottery and to receiving 2.6 consumption units with certainty in the second period, while the risk neutral decision maker is indifferent between the lottery and receiving 6.8 consumption units with certainty. Observe that not only the risk averse, but also the risk neutral decision maker has a preference for smoothing consumption over time: He is willing to accept a reduction of 0.6 units in overall consumption in order to smooth his uneven certainty equivalent consumption path of 12 units in period 0 and 6.8 units in period 1 to a welfare equivalent consumption path where he consumes 9.1 units in both periods.
Discussion of the Representation
The discussion of the representation in Theorem 1 proceeds in two steps. First, I analyze a restricted version of the model limiting the space S to only two degrees of subjectivity. This restricted version of the model is a straight-forward generalization of Klibanoff et al.'s (2009) smooth ambiguity setting. I show that, in the generalized setting, Klibanoff et al.'s (2009) definition of smooth ambiguity aversion is "ambiguous" and I offer a more precise definition. Moreover, I disentangle intertemporal substitutability from risk aversion and ambiguity aversion. Then, I proceed to discuss the general setting with an arbitrary number of degrees of subjectivity in the lottery space. In particular, I generalize the definition of smooth ambiguity aversion to a notion of aversion to subjectivity or to the lack of confidence.
A binary classification of subjectivity or confidence
I start by interpreting a special case of the representation obtained from restricting the degrees of subjectivity to #S = 2. I associate the two elements s ∈ S = {subj, obj} with subjective and objective beliefs. Two further restrictions transform it into the smooth ambiguity model of Klibanoff et al. (2009) -translated into the von NeumannMorgenstern setting. First, the evaluation of objective lotteries in Klibanoff et al.'s (2009) setting is (intertemporally) risk neutral in the sense that f obj t is absent from their representation. This latter point will be discussed in detail further below. Second, Klibanoff et al. (2009) restrict the number of uncertainty layers in every time period to N = 2 and impose a hierarchy of beliefs implying that decision makers can Subjective Risk, Confidence, and Ambiguity only face subjective lotteries over objective lotteries, but not vice versa. Uncertainty resolving in period t of the form depicted by lottery p r t on the right of Figure 1 would qualify for the restricted setting if s = subj and s ′ = s ′′ = obj (but not if s = obj and s ′ = s ′′ = subj, e.g. representing a coin flip over whether to enter a situation of subjective risk). In contrast, the representation in Theorem 1 permits an arbitrary sequence of subjective and objective lotteries (within every period). Maintaining these restrictions, the first interesting insight is that the representation in Theorem 1 is close to the standard von Neumann-Morgenstern setting. Lotteries simply have to be labeled by their degree of subjectivity and even the independence axiom is preserved. Thus, explicitly introducing the dimensions that Ellsberg (1961) already found missing in the Savage framework, i.e. a degree of confidence or subjectivity of belief, leads straight forwardly from von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) to a model of smooth ambiguity aversion. The next insight concerns the interpretation of Klibanoff et al.'s (2009) concept of smooth ambiguity aversion. For this purpose, I briefly relate the representation in Theorem 1 to the generalized isoelastic model of Epstein & Zin (1989) and Weil (1990) . A priori, a decision maker's propensity to smooth consumption over time is a different preference characteristic than his risk aversion. However, the intertemporally additive expected utility standard model implicitly assumes that these different dimensions of preference coincide. Epstein & Zin (1989) and Weil (1990) observed that in a one commodity version of Kreps & Porteus's (1978) recursive utility model of temporal lotteries disentangles these two dimensions of preference. Traeger (2007) shows in a setting corresponding to a #S = 1 version of the current model, that the function f t measures the difference between Arrow Pratt risk aversion and aversion to intertemporal substitution. As there is only one type of risk in the cited analysis, there is only one function f t in every period used for uncertainty aggregation. He names f t a measure of intertemporal risk aversion. It measures the part of risk aversion that is not simply a cause of a decision maker's propensity to smooth over time, but due an intrinsic aversion to risk. The concept of intertemporal risk aversion is not limited to the one-commodity setting of the Epstein & Zin (1989) framework, but generalizes to arbitrary dimensions and to settings without a naturally given measure scale of the good under observation. The following axiomatic characterization is put forth in Traeger (2007) . For two given consumption paths x, x ′ ∈ X t , I define the 'best of combination' path 
where 1 2
denotes a lottery of equal chance over the paths
The premise states that a decision maker is indifferent between the certain consumption paths x and x ′ . Then, an intertemporal risk averse decision maker prefers the consumption path x (or equivalently x ′ ) with certainty over a lottery that yields with equal probability either a path combining all the best outcomes or a path combining all the worst outcomes. The cited paper shows that the function f t in the representation is concave if and only if equation (7) holds. In a certainty additive representation, as employed in the current paper, intertemporal risk aversion can also be interpreted as risk aversion with respect to utility gains and losses. The definition of intertemporal risk aversion extends straight forwardly to a setting with differing degrees of risk aversion to objective versus subjective lotteries. I characterize intertemporal risk aversion to objective lotteries by requiring for all
implying concavity of f obj t , and similarly intertemporal risk aversion to subjective lotteries by requiring for all x,
implying concavity of f subj t
. Klibanoff et al. (2009) implicitly assume that f obj = id, which corresponds to indifference in equation (8). This assumption implies that uncertainty evaluation with respect to objective (or first order) lotteries is intertemporal
8 Traeger (2007) shows how these paths can be defined purely in terms of preferences. 9 Analogously, a strict intertemporal risk averse decision maker can be defined by assuming in addition that there exists some period t * such that u(x t * ) = u(x ′ t * ) and requiring a strict preference ≻ rather than the weak preference in equation (7). (6) where p t and p ′ t are different subjective lotteries over the set of objective lotteries, whose representatives arep t
•û t (x t , p t+1 ) dp t (x t , p t+1 ) dp t (p t )
•û t (x t , p t+1 ) dp t (x t , p t+1 ) dp Subjective Risk, Confidence, and Ambiguity nition of ambiguity aversion does not pin down whether smooth ambiguity aversion should be captured by intertemporal aversion to subjective risk, captured in f subj t and characterized by the lottery choice (9), or whether it should be characterized by the functions f amb t measuring the additional risk aversion to subjective risk as opposed to objective risk. I suggest calling the latter a measure of smooth ambiguity aversion.
Definition 1: A decision maker exhibits (strict) smooth ambiguity aversion in period t if the function
in the preference representation of Theorem 1 is (strictly) concave.
I follow Klibanoff et al. (2009) in defining the term by means of characteristics of the representation. However, (strict) concavity of the function f amb t is a characteristic of preferences that is independent of a particular version of the representation. Employing equations (8) and (9) the condition f
−1 concave translates smooth ambiguity aversion in period t into the requirement that for all
However, ambiguity aversion can be characterized more simply by recognizing that the intertemporal aspect of the risk comparison can be dropped.
Proposition 1: A decision maker exhibits (strict) smooth ambiguity aversion in the sense of Definition 1 if, and only if, for all x,
In a one-commodity setting, 11 the model gives rise to a three-fold disentanglement that can be expressed in terms of six different but related concepts (sharing three degrees of freedom):
• the functions u t characterize aversion to intertemporal substitution,
• the functions f subj t characterize intertemporal risk aversion to objective risk, Subjective Risk, Confidence, and Ambiguity
• the functions f obj t characterize intertemporal risk aversion to subjective risk,
• the functions f amb t = f subj t
• (f obj t ) −1 characterize smooth ambiguity aversion,
• the functions g obj t ≡ f obj t
• u t measure Arrow Pratt risk aversion with respect to objective lotteries, and
• the functions g subj t ≡ f subj t
• u t measure Arrow Pratt risk aversion with respect to subjective risk.
If follows immediately that, in the one-commodity setting, smooth ambiguity aversion can be expressed also as the difference in Arrow Pratt risk aversion with respect to subjective risk and Arrow Pratt risk aversion with respect to objective risk:
The general representation and aversion to the subjectivity of belief
A unique measure of ambiguity aversion is tied to the setting with #S = 2. In general, a decision maker will not always be able to employ a binary classification scheme for the subjectivity of or confidence in lotteries. While objective probabilities are generally classified as those derived from symmetry reasoning or long-run, high frequency observations, subjective risk is basically any probabilistic belief not obtained in that way, which leaves a wide range of belief types for a single category. Examples include the odds based on a short time series or a slightly irregular dice, a horse race lottery, the odds of a 2 • C global warming by 2050 due to climate change, or weather characteristics in Tomboctou on November 22nd 2012. In general, different decision makers are likely to classify different lotteries in different categories. Assume that a decision maker has a complete order over the elements in S in terms of subjectivity. Let s ⊲ s ′ denote that a lottery labeled s is more subjective than a lottery labeled s ′ .
Definition 2: A decision maker is (strictly) averse to subjectivity of belief if
Subjective Risk, Confidence, and Ambiguity Alternatively, the situation s ⊲ s ′ can be interpreted as a decision maker being less confident in lotteries of category s than in lotteries of categories s ′ . Then, aversion to subjectivity of belief is equivalent to aversion to a lack of confidence in beliefs. For example, assume that the decision maker in the example of section 4.2 is most confident in the lotteries labeled s in Figure 1 and least confident when it comes to his probability estimates labeled s ′′ , i.e. s ′′ ⊲ s ′ ⊲ s. It is easily verified that the decision maker exhibits aversion to the subjectivity of belief: f
and f
2 are both concave (and the remaining case follow from transitivity). Definition 1 of smooth ambiguity aversion is the special case of aversion to the subjectivity of belief (or to the lack of confidence) in the case where #S = 2. Its characterization in terms of preferences straight-forwardly carries over to the generalization.
Proposition 2: A decision maker exhibits (strict) aversion to the subjectivity of belief in the sense of Definition 2 if, and only if, for all x, x ′ ∈ X t and s, s ′ ∈ S with s ⊲ s
A decision maker with aversion to the subjectivity of belief would prefer a scenario with better known probabilities over one with more subjective probabilities. He would be willing to pay for reducing subjectivity and increasing confidence. The next section relates the analysis of this paper to the behaviorally motivated literature. In such a context one can employ proposition 2 in order to construct an order on S. As I will point out, for some behaviorally plausible situations such an order might not exist. Finally note that a decision maker who is averse to the subjectivity of belief might exhibit standard risk aversion (or even risk neutrality) with respect to objective risk, but shy away from situations where he feels that he cannot assess the risk involved. If he exhibits extreme aversion to the subjectivity of belief and feels that he completely lacks the ability to assess the involved probabilities his decision criteria gets arbitrarily close to the framework of decision making under ignorance suggested by Arrow & Hurwicz (1972) . Here the decision maker simply maximizes the worst possible outcome. If this completely subjective lottery (or the complete lack of confidence) appears in the second uncertainty layer the decision maker behaves arbitrarily close to the decision maker in Gilboa & Schmeidler's (1989) wide-spread maximin expected Subjective Risk, Confidence, and Ambiguity utility model, where a decision maker maximizes the worst expected outcome (which here would be expectations over first order lotteries). While Arrow & Hurwicz's (1972) axioms yield maximin over deterministic outcomes and Gilboa & Schmeidler's (1989) axioms yield maximin over expectation, a general decision maker in the current framework can exhibit a decision criteria arbitrarily close to maximin on any layer, including maximin over evaluations employing the smooth ambiguity model, or risk (or ambiguity avers) expectations over maximin models. Thus, a single preference relation in the current framework can nest and interact the wide spread models of risk neutrality, Arrow Pratt risk aversion, maximin utility, maximin expected utility and smooth ambiguity aversion, depending on the situation the decision maker is facing.
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Implications and applications
The section starts out relating the present framework to the Ellsberg paradox. I then discuss how the representation restricts behavior. Finally, I sketch two normative applications of the model.
Relation to behavioral analysis
The axioms underlying the representation are selected on a normative basis. Nevertheless, the framework incorporates observed behavior as in the Ellsberg (1961) paradox that cannot be captured within the economic standard model. In this section, I briefly discuss how the present framework relates to the behaviorally motivated ambiguity literature in accommodating Ellsberg type behavior. I then proceed to point out a type of behavior relating to subjectivity attitude that is ruled out by the rationality constraints of the current paper.
In the experiments underlying the Ellsberg (1961) paradox, a decision maker has to bet on the color of a ball that is drawn from an urn. The crucial feature of the various variants of the experiment can be reflected by the following simplified choice situation. In one urn, the decision maker knows that half of the balls are red. In another urn, the decision maker only knows that it contains nothing but red and blue Subjective Risk, Confidence, and Ambiguity balls. For the first urn, the draw can be characterized by an objective probability of 1 2 for drawing a red ball. For the second urn, the principle of insufficient reason would give rise to a probability of 1 2 as well. However, a good fraction of the individuals in comparable settings prefer betting on the first urn where they know the number of red balls.
13 The Choquet expected utility approach to explaining the seemingly paradoxical choice abandons the concept of a probability and replaces it with a nonadditivity set function. The latter captures the decision maker's ambiguity about the red balls in the second urn. Choquet integrating over the capacities induces aversion to ambiguity. The multiple prior approach, instead, attaches a range of different probability distributions to drawing a red ball from the second urn and, e.g. in the simplest such approach formulated by Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989) , evaluates the bet by the worst expected outcome possible within the range of priors. The Klibanoff et al. (2009) approach assigns two layers of probability distributions to the urn with the unknown number of balls. The lower level probability distributions are interpreted as the possible urn compositions. Each such urn composition is interpreted as giving rise to an objective lottery. The higher level distribution assigns a subjective probability weight to each of these possible urn compositions identified with the objective lotteries. Obviously, the representation in Theorem 1 can handle the Ellsberg paradox in the same way. However, there is an alternative way to describe the behavior by means of the representation in Theorem 1. The decision maker attaches a probability of one half to the event drawing a red ball for both urns. However, he labels the urn where he knows the number of balls to be an objective lottery and he labels the lottery where the probability of a half is only obtained from the principle of insufficient reason to be a subjective lottery. If the decision maker is averse to the subjectivity of probabilistic beliefs, he prefers to bet on the "objective urn". Note that, in general, some fraction of the participants of an Ellsberg type experiment do not show the "paradoxical behavior" discussed above. The current framework can explain their behavior in two different ways. Either, they are not averse to the subjectivity of belief (ambiguity averse), or they might simply label any fair urn setting as objective. Behaviorally, aversion to subjectivity might not always be as convincing as in an .1 Figure 3 depicts a possible choice behavior corresponding to a non-global attitude with respect to subjectivity of belief.
Ellsberg (1961) type setting. Take a preference over lotteries as depicted on the left of Figure 3 . Here, a decision maker faces a large probability of a terrible outcome x delivering welfare u = u(x) and a small probability of a great outcome x delivering welfare u = u(x).
14 Agents in such a choice situation prefer the subjective over the objective lottery if they prefer that the probability, stating a terrible event is likely, is not objective or is of low confidence. Note that from a normative perspective, such a subjectivity loving behavior is probably judged undesirable as it implies that the decision maker would be willing to pay for reducing the quality of the probability assessment keeping expectations the same (a thought experiment only). Now assume that the same agent also exhibits the preference depicted on the right hand side of Figure 3 . The choice situation yields the good outcome with a high probability and the terrible outcome with a low probability. I suggest that, in such a situation, the same agent might prefer the objective over the subjective lottery for a similar motive that implied the opposite attitude above: He prefers the objective lottery over the subjective lottery because it makes the small probability (or the smallness of the probability) of the terrible event objective. 15 In summary, the choice behavior in Fig- ure 3 can be characterized as a preference for being less confident about distributions giving a bad outcome with high probability (or a bad expected outcome) as opposed to a preference for being confident about distributions that yield a good outcome with a high probability (or in expectation). As I show in Appendix A, such a preference is reflected by a convex-concave function f amb = f subj t
• (f 
Figure 4 represents a function f amb satisfying the necessary convex-concave characteristics for a global attitude reversal as in Figure 3 (left graph) and for multiple attitude reversals (right graph). The solid line in the right graph explains a choice according to Figure 3 for a lottery with outcomes x and x 2 as well as a lottery with outcomes x 2 and x. The dashed line accommodates the convexconcave characteristics corresponding to a subjectivity attitude reversal in a choice as in Figure 3 for a lottery with outcomes x 1 and x 3 , which is incompatible with the preference represented by the solid line. The points on the horizontal axis are
The example above does not violate any of the axioms underlying the representation in Theorem 1, but goes against a global subjectivity attitude. However, a related behavior can violate the axioms of the representation themselves. Assume that a decision maker exhibits a behavior as depicted in Figure 3 for a sufficiently large set of lotteries, rather than just for a lottery over a worst outcome x and a best outcome x. Given sufficient knowledge regarding the agent's choice on objective lotteries, I can select outcomes x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ∈ X * such that the points
spread approximately equidistantly with y = f obj (u) < y 1 < y 2 < y 3 < f obj (u) = y as depicted on the horizontal axis of the right graph in Figure 4 . Assume that the decision maker exhibits the subjectivity attitude reversal depicted in Figure 3 for a lottery over x and x 2 as well as for a lottery over x 2 and x. Then these preferences can be represented by a function f amb that is convex-concave on both, the interval [y,
as also the interval [y 2 , y]. An example for an ambiguity attitude function satisfying these requirements is depicted by the solid line in the right graph of Figure 4 . Now let the same type of subjectivity attitude reversal also hold for a lottery over x 1 and x 3 . Then f amb needs to exhibit convex-concave behavior also on the interval [y 1 , y 3 ] as represented by the dashed line in the right graph of Figure 4 . However, the curvature of the dashed line is contradicting the curvature of f amb implied by the earlier choices.
The graph illustrates why a sufficiently rich set of subjectivity reversals as in Figure Subjective Risk, Confidence, and Ambiguity 3 with overlapping welfare implications cannot be represented by a single function f amb and, therefore, violates the axiomatic framework underlying the representation in Theorem 1. Finally, let me point out a slightly different interpretation of the model in a behavioral context. Individuals could identify the index s with a degree of familiarity with a particular risk. Even when they are rationally aware that, for example, the risk of a tragic plane accident is lower than the risk of dying in a car accident, their familiarity with exposure to ground traffic related risk could imply a relatively lower aversion, while they shy away relatively more from a means of transportation they use less frequently, even if they are aware of the information that the risk is lower. In the first example, an uncertainty tree for a given period in the future starts with the root lottery capturing uncertainty about the stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. For a given pollution stock there is a subtree describing uncertainty about the temperature in the same period. For a given temperature there is uncertainty about precipitation. Given precipitation, there is uncertainty about agricultural yield. Given agricultural yield there is uncertainty about market prices and so on. Given such an uncertainty tree, the decision maker has to assign his degree of confidence or of subjectivity to each of these lotteries. For example, he assigns relatively more confidence to the subtrees determining a temperature and precipitation distribution if the parent corresponds to a low emission scenario resulting in a more familiar climate. In contrast, if the subtrees branch out from a very high realization of the greenhouse gas stock, the decision maker considers the probabilistic estimates of the temperature and the precipitation distribution less reliable, labeling the nodes with a lower confidence level. Assume that the decision maker is averse to subjectivity of belief as formalized in Definition 2. Then, he attaches a relatively lower value Subjective Risk, Confidence, and Ambiguity to the more subjective subtrees stemming from a higher perturbation of the climate system than a decision maker who does not distinguish lotteries by their confidence or subjectivity. Thus, a first conjecture would be that a decision maker with aversion to the subjectivity of belief would be willing to invest more into measures keeping him in a climate region that he can predict more confidently.
In the second example, a decision maker anticipates learning about the future as time goes by. The recursive structure of the welfare representation naturally invites a dynamic programming setup where the agent takes anticipated learning into account in his current decisions. Let me consider two layers of parametric uncertainty stacked over a layer of stochasticity that cannot be resolved. To make the example concrete, consider once more an agent deciding in the climate change context. A decision maker's payoffs are determined by local temperature and precipitation patterns, depending on the system's variables. In order to predict future temperatures and precipitation he employs a regional climate model that is coupled to a global model. However, there are unknowns θ 1 in the characterizations of the regional climate model and unknowns θ 2 characterizing the global model. Given both, θ 1 and θ 2 , the weather characteristics w relevant to his payoffs are purely stochastic and given by the conditional distribution µ 0 (w|θ 1 , θ 2 ). Given θ 1 and θ 2 he trusts his model enough to label this lottery µ 0 (w|θ 1 , θ 2 ) objective. In contrast, he assigns a low confidence level to his prior µ 1 (θ 1 |θ 2 ) over the information state θ 1 characterizing the regional model (the prior might depend on the information underlying the global model θ 2 ). He assigns a higher confidence level to the prior µ 2 (θ 2 ), given that local climate models frequently face even harder challenges than global ones. The important difference to the first example is that the current decision maker spells out how the informational variables evolve over time in order to derive an optimal decision. A standard way to model this learning process would be Bayesian. The decision maker updates his priors µ 1 and µ 2 based on observing regional and global characteristics related to the informational states by means of a likelihood function. In general, the informational states will be informed by a variety of observations with a subset being the payoff relevant characteristics w governed by µ 0 . However, in the climate context, the physical observations might even play a minor role as opposed to advancements in the models, driven by computer power and modeling techniques. These advances may be treated by considering the generated results as new observations. However, such a treatment would be somewhat arbitrary in deciding when the results of improved models should be con-sidered a new observation. Moreover, it has to be decided whether old 'observations' based on outdated models should be eliminated from the observation set. With this example I want to point out that confidence in models that generate predictions is likely to change over time. Such a change is not easily captured by means of Bayesian learning. Bayesian learning in a multi-layer ambiguity model could only shrink priors within a given level. With sufficient information, in the long run, the priors could shrink to a singleton and the decision maker would be left with objective uncertainty or stochasticity. In contrast, it might be desirable to formulate a learning process that changes the confidence label of a lottery over time. The current framework permits an arbitrary number of confidence levels and changes over time. It thereby encourages the development of a richer framework for learning incorporating the confidence dimensions into the learning process. Finally, let me point out that the decision maker can calculate a reduced expected probability distribution over the weather characteristics by integrating over the priors: p(w) = µ 0 (w|θ 1 , θ 2 )dµ 1 (θ 1 |θ 2 )dµ 2 (θ 2 ). For inference purposes, or, for obtaining a 'best guess' of the final outcomes the decision maker can treat all probability distributions the same, at least in a straight forward probabilistic application. However, the different layers of uncertainty corresponding to different degrees of confidence or subjectivity have to be distinguished for the welfare evaluation. Here the layers have to be evaluated recursively, each with the corresponding degree of aversion.
Conclusions
The paper presents a model for evaluating scenarios that involve probabilistic beliefs that differ in their degree of subjectivity or confidence. It respects the normatively desirable axioms of von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) and of time consistency. The evaluation of scenarios employs only simple tools from risk analysis, where the risk measures become confidence dependent. The representation facilitates a unified framework for representing aversion to intertemporal substitution, aversion to objective risk, aversion to subjective risk, and smooth ambiguity aversion. Moreover, the representation facilitates a better understanding and a more precise definition of smooth ambiguity aversion as the additional intertemporal risk aversion to subjective as opposed to objective lotteries. The previous literature formulates the concept of smooth ambiguity aversion in a hierarchical and binary context of purely subjective second order beliefs over purely objective first order beliefs. The present representation frees the subjectivity characterization form this straitjacket by incorporating the degree of subjectivity directly into the notion of a lottery. I introduce the concept of aversion to the subjectivity of belief or, equivalently, aversion to the lack of confidence in beliefs. It generalizes the concept of smooth ambiguity aversion to settings with more than just two types of lotteries (a binary measurement of confidence). A given set of preferences can nest and interact behavior exhibiting risk neutrality, Arrow-Pratt risk aversion, and smooth ambiguity aversion as well as decision criteria arbitrarily close to Arrow & Hurwicz's (1972) maximin under ignorance and Gilboa & Schmeidler's (1989) maximin expected utility under ambiguity, depending on the situation the decision maker is facing, his confidence (or ignorance), and his aversion to the lack of confidence. I discussed behavioral implications and sketched two applications as a decision support framework in the context of climate change, an area where the International Panel on Climate Change has promoted an according qualitative distinction of probabilistic estimates. The modeling framework can be applied to all fields of economics where uncertainty plays a major role. The paper invites a wide alley of research on learning in terms of simultaneous updating of probabilities and confidence. Subjective Risk, Confidence, and Ambiguity using first equation (10) and then axiom A3. Figure 3 implies a convex-concave function f amb :
Choice in
Let p = 0.1 and p = 0.9 and let u = u(x) and u = u(x). Then, the choice on the left hand side of Figure 3 translates into the condition
⇔ pf subj • f obj −1 (y) + pf subj • f obj −1 (y) > f subj • f obj −1 p y + p y ⇔ pf amb (y) + pf amb (y) > f amb p y + p y , where y = f obj (u) and y = f obj (u). Thus, the function f amb at the point 0.9 y + 0.1 y has to lie below the straight line connecting f amb (y) and f amb (y). Similarly, defining p = 0.9 and p = 0.1, the right hand side choice depicted in Figure 3 implies that f amb at the point 0.1 y + 0.9 y has to lie above the straight line connecting f amb (y) and f amb (y). In consequence, the function f amb has to be convex somewhere in the lower region [y, 0.9 y + 0.1 y) and concave somewhere in the higher region (0.1 y + 0.9 y, y] (subsequently to being convex).
Appendix B
Proof of Theorem 1: Part I develops the representation for a single layer of uncertainty in a given period. Part II builds the recursive evaluation of a general uncertainty tree within a given period. Part III constructs the intertemporal aggregation. Part IV shows that all axioms are satisfied by the representation.
Part I 1) Let X t = X * × P t+1 ∀ t < T and X T = X * . By axioms A2 and A4 there exists an ordinal representation V 0 t : X t → IR of the preference relation t | Xt , which is restricted to degenerate period t outcomes. 2) For a given parameter s, axioms A2-A4 on ∆ s (X t ) are the standard von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms for a compact metric setting that permit an expected utility presentation on ∆ s (X t ). The only distinction of the current setting is that elements p t are formally distinguished from the the degenerate lotteries 1 1 pt . However, as I explain in the context of equation Subjective Risk, Confidence, and Ambiguity (10) in Appendix A, axioms A2 and A3 (or, alternatively, axiom A1) imply p t ∼ 1 1 s pt . Therefore, the standard mixture space arguments apply and the usual reasoning implies the existence of a particular V 0 t * that makes it possible to represent preferences over lotteries in the expected utility form. Instead of using this standard representation, I follow Traeger (2007) t dp represents t | ∆s(Xt) for all p ∈ ∆ s (X t ). Moreover, f and f ′ both represent in the above sense if, and only if, there exist a, b ∈ IR, a > 0 such that f ′ = af +b .
3) Carrying out step 2) for all s ∈ S results in a set of increasing and continuous functionsf t = {f • V 0 t dp t ifn(p t ) = 1 .
Part II constructs inductively a representation of t | Z n t (Xt) for n ∈ N . 4) LetV n t : Z n t (X t ) → IR represent t | Z n t (Xt) . By equation (10) degenerate lotteries in ∆ s (Z n t (X t )) are assigned the same values as the corresponding elements in Z n t (X t ). That identification makesV n t a representation for degenerate lotteries in Z n+1 t (X t ). Thus, for a given s, by axioms A2-A4 and Theorem 1 in Traeger (2007) , cited in step 2, preference over lotteries in ∆ s (Z n t (X t )) can be represented by p t ) dp t (p t ) for some strictly increasing and continuous functionf s t : range(V n t ) → IR. Employing the representation theorem for each s ∈ S delivers a representation over the union Subjective Risk, Confidence, and Ambiguity ordinal representation of preferences on the space of degenerate outcomes in period t, i.e. for t | Xt . Axioms A2, A4, and A5 imply a certainty additive representation for preferences restricted to the subspace of certain consumption paths (Wakker 1988, theorem III.4.1) .
16 I denote the corresponding continuous per period utility functions by u t : X * → IR. They are unique up to affine transformations with a coinciding multiplicative constant (and heterogeneous additive constants). 8) For the last period I can choose V 0 t =û T = u T . I show recursively thatû t−1 (x t−1 , p t ) = u t−1 (x t−1 ) + Mf t ut p t is an (ordinal) representation of t−1 | X t−1 given thatû t is an (ordinal) representation of t | Xt . By construction of the uncertainty aggregator Mf t ut , a certain consumption path x t = (x t , x t+1 , . . . , x T ) is evaluated toû t (x t ) = T τ =t u τ (x τ ). I define a certainty equivalent of a lottery p t ∈ P t to be a lottery ( ′ } are closed in X T +1 endowed with the relative topology for all x ∈ X T +1 . Moreover the relative topology on X T +1 is the product topology on X T +1 . 17 The existence is most easily observed from the representation already constructed. The uncertainty aggregator is a generalized mean and, thus, the value of any lottery lies between the value of the worst and the best outcome. For more details see induction hypothesis H2 in proof of theorem 2 in Traeger (2007) .
